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A, which is absent in technology transfer. We show that compared to the situation of
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1 Introduction
In this era of globalization it has become increasingly common for firms to outsource their
required inputs rather than produce them in-house. While many factors influence a firm’s
decision to outsource, it can be argued that outsourcing is primarily driven by cost con-
siderations.1 A firm will choose to outsource if the input supplier can offer a price that is
lower than the firm’s in-house cost. This will be the case if the supplier has a cost advan-
tage in one or more factors of production. Such advantages can be interpreted broadly as
the supplier having a superior production technology. For example, the supplier may be
able to hire skilled labor at a relatively low wage or it may possess advanced machineries.
It is therefore plausible that as a mode of production, transfer of technology across firms
could be an alternative to outsourcing. In fact, like outsourcing, technology transfers have
also grown substantially in recent years.2 As outsourcing and technology transfer broadly
serve the same purpose of enabling one firm to use the cost-efficient production process of
another firm, a natural question is, what would make firms choose one of these contracts
over another? A closely related question is, what are the relative effects of these contracts
on the consumers? This paper seeks to address these questions in the context of imperfectly
competitive markets.
There could be different possible reasons for firms to prefer outsourcing over technology
transfer. For instance, the superior technology may be labor intensive and difficult to transfer
due to imperfect mobility of labor. Additionally, transfer of technology may involve other
barriers such as intellectual property rights laws, or large initial investments that firms may
want to avoid. On the other hand, under technology transfer, a firm can produce its inputs
in-house using the superior technology which gives it complete control over its production.
So a firm may prefer technology transfer in order to maintain a higher quality standard or
to avoid the risk of relying on an external supplier for its inputs.
Apart from these reasons, strategic considerations play an important role in determining
the nature of input production decisions of firms. Such considerations will be particularly
dominant when an input-seeking firm competes with its supplier in the final good market.
Exploring the differences in the strategic aspects of outsourcing and technology transfer
contracts in duopolies, this paper characterizes situations where firms would adopt one of
these contracts over the other. We also study the consequences of these contract choices on
consumers.
We carry out our analysis in a Hotelling duopoly model with two firms A and B who
are located3 at two different end points of the unit interval in the final good market ϕ.
Consumers are uniformly distributed in this interval and incur linear transportation costs
for traveling to the end points. Any consumer buys at most one unit of ϕ from either A or B.
We consider a production process where an intermediate good η is required to manufacture
1See, e.g., Hummels et al. (2001) and Amiti and Wei (2005) for evidence of the growth of international
outsourcing. For a discussion of diverse factors that drive outsourcing, see, e.g., Jarillo (1993), Vidal and
Goetschalckx (1997), Domberger (1998) and Vagadia (2007).
2For some recent empirical evidence on the growth of technology transfer across firms, see, e.g., Mendi
(2005), Nagaoka (2005), Branstetter et al. (2006) and Wakasugi and Ito (2009).
3The location in the Hotelling model can literally stand for geographic location or it could correspond
to product characteristic. See, e.g., Anderson et al., (1992) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992) for different
interpretations of the Hotelling model.
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ϕ. Each firm can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good ϕ at zero cost. Both A
and B can produce η, but firm B has a lower cost due to a superior technology. Outsourcing
(firm A orders η from firm B) and technology transfer (firm B transfers its technology to
firm A) are two contracts that naturally arise in this situation. We study these contracts
by considering unit-based pricing policies for both cases, where the unit price is determined
through negotiations between firms A and B. Under an outsourcing contract, firm A can
place any order with firm B at the agreed upon price. Under a technology transfer contract,
firm A uses the superior technology of firm B by paying a price for each unit of production,
i.e., the technology transfer contract is based on a unit royalty.4 We denote ω to be the
effective unit cost of firm A in any contract and compare these contracts by fixing ω. We
show that these two contracts generate different strategic interactions between firms and
consequently result in different prices in the final good market.
Specifically we show that compared to the case of no contracts, prices in the final good
market never rise under outsourcing (Proposition 2) while this is not necessarily the case
under technology transfer. There are always weakly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts
that make both firms better off and no consumers worse off compared to the situation of no
contracts. Moreover if the cost difference of firms is sufficiently large (i.e., firm B’s technology
is sufficiently superior), there are strictly Pareto improving outsourcing contracts that make
both firms as well as all consumers better off compared to the case of no contracts (Prop 3).
On the other hand, there are no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts: whenever
both firms prefer technology transfer over no contracts, there are always some consumers
who pay a price in the final good market that is higher than what they paid in the absence
of either contracts (Prop 4).
Comparing outsourcing and technology transfer contracts by fixing ω (the effective unit
cost of η for firm A), it is shown that there is a conflict between the incentives of firms and
the interest of consumers. For any ω, (i) if both firms prefer outsourcing over technology
transfer, there are always some consumers who prefer technology transfer over outsourcing
and (ii) if both firms prefer technology transfer over outsourcing, there are always some
consumers who prefer outsourcing over technology transfer (Prop 5). It is also shown that
if the supplier firm B has a relatively large bargaining power in negotiating the terms of a
contract, then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing
(Prop 6).
An outsourcing order from A to B is equivalent to an endogenous capacity building by
A prior to competition in the final good market. As firm A’s capacity is in effect built
by its rival firm B, the volume of this endogenous capacity plays an interesting role of
information transmission. It credibly informs B that A is committed to maintain a specific
market share, which establishes A as the Stackelberg leader in the final good market.5 This
is where Hotelling meets Stackelberg. The Stackelberg leadership effect generated by the
outsourcing contract is the novel feature of our model. Wauthy (1996) and Boccard and
Wauthy (2005) also study the the role of capacities in the Hotelling location model, but they
4We consider unit pricing policies for outsourcing and unit royalty policies for technology transfer because
they are most frequently observed in practice. See Robinson and Kalakota (2004) and Vagadia (2007) for
evidence on outsourcing and Mendi (2005) and Nagaoka (2005) for technology transfer.
5When firms A and B compete in quantities as Cournot duopolists, A’s outsourcing order corresponds to
the Stackelberg leader output (see Baake et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2011). See Section 2 for a more detailed
discussion.
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consider exogenous capacities. Capacity is endogenous in the well-known model of Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983) [KS]. However, firms choose their capacities independently in KS,
so unlike our model there is no prior information transmission. As capacities are either
exogenous or independently chosen by firms, the Stackelberg leadership effect is absent in
these papers.
To see the impact of Stackelberg leadership, observe that when the contracted unit price
ω of the intermediate good η is small, the Stackelberg leader’s market share is larger than
A’s market share under no contracts. This large share is sustained in equilibrium by a lower
price of firm A in the final good market ϕ. Given that A’s commitment of Stackelberg market
share is credible, B’s equilibrium price is also set lower and prices of both firms fall. This
results in lower profit in the market ϕ for firm B. So B would accept such an outsourcing
contract only if it can obtain a large supplier profit from η to compensate for its losses in the
market ϕ. This happens when firm B is sufficiently more efficient compared to firm A. The
upshot is that when the cost difference of two firms is sufficiently large, there are strictly
Pareto improving outsourcing contracts: both firms prefer outsourcing over no contracts and
both set a lower price for ϕ that makes all consumers better off (Prop 3(I)(a)).
Under technology transfer, firm A acquires B’s superior technology and produces η itself
using this technology. As a result, firm B knows the quantity of η produced by A only
when it receives its payments for technology transfer. As these payments are received after
profits are realized in the final good market, the informational aspect in outsourcing is
completely absent under technology transfer. Moreover since firm B’s payments from the
transfer depends on the demand of A, it has an incentive to ensure that A’s demand is not
too small. This creates a distortion that raises the effective cost of B which in turn adversely
affects prices in the market ϕ. Due to this distortion, technology transfer contracts that are
preferred by both firms necessarily make some consumers worse off. Consequently, unlike the
case of outsourcing, there are no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts in relation
to the situation of no contracts (Prop 4(III)(c)). It should be mentioned that the distortive
effect of royalty contracts is well known in the literature. Our analysis is closely related to
Matsumura et al. (2010) who also consider technology transfer among firms in a Hotelling
model. However, they focus on optimal contracts from the viewpoint of the efficient firm,
while our objective is to characterize the market outcomes for all values of ω and compare
these with the corresponding outcomes under outsourcing.
To sum up, the difference between outsourcing and technology transfer in our model is
driven by two factors: first, the information transmission and the subsequent Stackelberg
leadership effect that leads to lower prices under outsourcing is absent under technology
transfer, and second, outsourcing orders are obtained upfront before firms set their prices,
so outsourcing has no distortive effect.
The paper is organized as follows. The related literature is discussed in Section 2. We
present the model in Section 3. Three contractual settings—no contracts, outsourcing and
technology transfer, are studied in Section 4. Comparison of outsourcing and technology
transfer contracts is carried out in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. Most proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
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2 Related literature
As we consider outsourcing contracts between rival firms who compete in prices in the final
good market, this paper is most closely related to the literature on horizontal outsourcing
(i.e., a firm outsources to a supplier which is its competing rival in the final good market)
under price competition. The existing literature has considered horizontal outsourcing under
different models of price competition such as a Hotelling duopoly (Shy and Stenbacka, 2003),6
a duopoly with differentiated products (Chen et al., 2004) and a Bertrand duopoly (Arya et
al., 2008). All these papers arrive at the same conclusion: outsourcing is inefficient and leads
to higher prices in the final good market. To a certain extent we obtain similar implications
under technology transfer where we show that there are no Pareto improving contracts: for
any contract that makes both firms better off, there are always some consumers who are
worse off. In contrast, we show that under outsourcing, prices never rise and there always
exist Pareto improving contracts that make both firms better off and no consumers worse
off (and sometimes all consumers better off as well). Thus our result on outsourcing sharply
differs with the conclusion of the existing literature.
This difference arises because the existing literature generally treats outsourcing and
technology transfer equivalently. Specifically, it overlooks the informational aspect of out-
sourcing which is the main focus of this paper. The information transmission and the
subsequent Stackelberg leadership effect in outsourcing is driven by our presumed sequence
of events. In our model firm A places its outsourcing order of η first and then prices are
set in the market ϕ. The papers mentioned before implicitly assume an alternative sequence
where the input-seeking firm places its outsourcing order with its rival after firms set their
prices in the final good market. Under this sequence outsourcing does not transmit any
information to the supplier firm prior to price competition. Since outsourcing order is not
received upfront, to obtain higher profit from outsourcing the supplier has to ensure that the
input-seeking firm’s demand is not too small. As a result, the distortive effect of technology
transfer is present in outsourcing which explains why outsourcing contracts are inefficient
under the sequence assumed in the existing literature.
Having outsourcing and technology transfer in the same model enables us to identify the
differences in the strategic aspects of these two industry practices, which are not generally
recognized in the existing literature of horizontal outsourcing under price competition. In so
doing, we present a more complete analysis of production choices of firms. In particular, this
paper brings to light the Stackelberg leadership effect in this context, whose efficiency impli-
cations are very different than those obtained in the literature. As noted before, our distinct
modeling aspect is the presumed sequence: firms place outsourcing orders before rather than
after the product market meets. It can be justified on the ground that outsourcing orders
take time to process due to logistics, transportation and stages of inspection. These factors
are particularly dominant if the supplier is located offshore. If a firm places its outsourcing
order after receiving its demand, it may not be able to meet its demand on time. For this
reason it is natural to assume that firms negotiate and sign an outsourcing contract well in
advance before the final goods market meets. However, if the nature of the input is such
that it can be supplied in relatively short notice, then the presumed sequence of the existing
6The primary focus of Shy and Stenbacka (2003) is vertical outsourcing (i.e. firms outsource to an outside
supplier), although they consider horizontal outsourcing as well.
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literature may apply. Empirical research points out the growth of international outsourcing
in manufacturing as well as service sectors (see, e.g., Egger and Stehrer, 2003; Amiti and
Wei, 2009). Our modeling sequence more readily fits the manufacturing sector where input
production and supply arguably involve more time compared to service-based inputs.
It should be mentioned that our approach is also consistent with the literature of out-
sourcing under quantity competition. In these models, the input-seeking firm chooses its
outsourcing order first and then firms choose quantities in the final good market. The Stack-
elberg leadership effect is direct under quantity competition: by placing an outsourcing
order with a rival firm in a Cournot duopoly, the input-seeking firm can establish itself as
the Stackelberg leader (see Baake et al., 1995; Chen et al., 2011). The leadership effect is
indirect in our model. Following the outsourcing order by firm A, equilibrium prices are
formed in a way so that A’s market share exactly equals the quantity of intermediate good
it has ordered from B. By showing the presence of the leadership effect under price compe-
tition, this paper bridges the gap in the existing literature between the outsourcing models
of quantity and price competitions.
This paper also relates to the literature of organizational choices.7 Since in our model
an outsourcing order is equivalent to endogenous capacity, it can be viewed as building of
inventory. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) argue that inventory building and information on
future demand are substitutes, as more information on future demand reduces the need
to build a large inventory. By showing that inventory building in the form of outsourcing
order may itself convey information on the intended future demand, this paper brings out
an alternative interrelation between inventory and information. Our framework also closely
resembles Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999) [NVB] who consider a two-stage Cournot
duopoly game where firms choose one of the two organizational structures (market or hierar-
chy) before they compete. NVB show that depending on the magnitude of asset specificity,
“organizational heterogeneity” (i.e., firms choosing different organizational structures) may
emerge. In NVB, firms independently make their organizational choices. In our model an
organizational structure is a specific form of contract (outsourcing or technology transfer)
between the rival firms. So the organizational choices of firms are necessarily dependent in
our model, which is the key difference with NVB. The main focus of NVB is to study the role
of asset specificity, while we seek to understand the strategic aspects of production modes
that result from contracts between rival firms.
We conclude this section by noting that the duopoly structure of this paper applies to
various situations. One important application of the model is in retailing. Our model can
correspond to a retail market where firm A is primarily a retailer with an inefficient produc-
tion while its competing retailer B is an efficient manufacturer. In that case, outsourcing
and technology transfer will correspond to two different forms of retail contracts. Under
outsourcing, only the efficient retailer is active as manufacturer while both are active under
technology transfer. In our paper these contracts are based on unit prices but our basic
framework can be used to consider more general retail contracts. Our model also applies
to an international setting where one of the firms could be a foreign firm, or both could be
multinationals competing in a third country.
7This literature is large (see, e.g., Riordan and Williamson, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) and we do
not attempt to summarize it here. See Williamson (2002) for a comprehensive overview.
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3 The model
The final good market: The market for the final good ϕ is a linear city Hotelling duopoly
with two firms A and B. Firm A is located at point 0 and firm B at point 1 of the unit
interval [0, 1]. Firms compete in prices.
Consumers are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Any consumer buys either one unit of good
ϕ, or buys nothing. Consumers receive utility V > 0 from good ϕ and utility 0 from not
buying.
The unit cost of transportation is τ > 0. For a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1], the
transportation cost to travel to firm A is τx, while the cost to travel to firm B is τ(1− x).
A consumer who buys one unit of good ϕ from either A or B gets utility V, pays the price
and incurs the cost of transportation.
Let pA, pB ≥ 0 be the prices set by firms A,B and denote p ≡ (pA, pB). Given any p, let
upx(i) be the net utility of the consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1] from purchasing good ϕ from
firm i, so that
upx(i) =
{
V − pA − τx if i = A
V − pB − τ(1− x) if i = B (1)
We assume that V is a sufficiently large positive number, i.e., consumers receive a large utility
from purchasing good ϕ, so that not buying the good is never an optimal choice. Under this
assumption, any consumer buys the good from either firm A or firm B and consequently the
market ϕ is covered.8 A consumer at location x determines her optimal purchasing choice
by comparing upx(A) and u
p
x(B) from (1).
Demand of firms: Let DA(p) and DB(p) be the demand received by firms A,B when
they set prices pA, pB. It follows from (1) that u
p
x(A) T upx(B)⇔ x S x˜(p) where
x˜(p) := (pB − pA + τ)/2τ (2)
So a consumer at location x ∈ [0, 1] buys from A if x < x˜(p) and from B if x > x˜(p).
Observe that if pA < pB + τ, then x˜(p) < 0 and all consumers buy from B. On the other
hand, if pB > pA + τ, then x˜(p) > 1 and all consumers buy from A. If pA < pB + τ and
pB < pA + τ , then 0 < x˜(p) < 1. In that case, consumers at location x ∈ [0, x˜(p)) buy from
A and x ∈ (x˜(p), 1] from B. Hence we conclude that
(DA(p), DB(p)) =

(0, 1) if pA ≥ pB + τ
(1, 0) if pB ≥ pA + τ
(x˜(p), 1− x˜(p)) if pA < pB + τ and pB < pA + τ
(3)
The intermediate good: An intermediate good η is required to produce ϕ. Both firms
can convert one unit of good η into one unit of good ϕ at the same constant marginal cost,
which we normalize to zero.
The constant marginal cost of production of good η is c > 0 for A and c > 0 for B. Firm
B has a superior technology for producing η, so its cost is lower, i.e., c < c. We also assume
that
0 < c < c < τ (4)
8Note that we consider the transportation cost of a consumer to be linear in distance x, given by τx.
When the market is covered, the quadratic transportation cost τx2 will generate the same demands and
profits for firms.
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The effective unit cost of η for a firm will depend on the nature of contracts that A and B
have in the intermediate good market. We consider the following possibilities:
(i) No contract between A and B;
(ii) Outsourcing contract between A and B: A orders η from B;
(iii) Technology transfer from B to A: firm B transfers its superior technology of producing
η to firm A.
Before formally describing the three contractual situations above, it will be useful for our
analysis to introduce the Hotelling duopoly game H(cA, cB).
The Hotelling duopoly game H(cA, cB): This is the standard Hotelling duopoly game
played between firms A and B in the final good market ϕ, where the constant unit cost of
producing the intermediate good η is cA ≥ 0 for firm A and cB ≥ 0 for firm B and each
firm can transform one unit of η to one unit of ϕ at zero cost. This game has the following
stages.
Stage 1: Firms A,B simultaneously set prices pA, pB ≥ 0. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), firm i
receives the demand Di(p), which is given by (3).
Stage 2: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
The demand fulfilling constraints are qA ≥ DA(p) and qB ≥ DB(p). If the cost of producing
η is positive for firm i, optimality requires that it produces qi = Di(p) units of η and
transforms these Di(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its demand. If the cost is zero, it is
optimal for i to produce any qi ≥ Di(p) units of η and transform Di(p) units to good ϕ to
fulfill its demand. In either case, the payoff (profit) functions of A and B in H(cA, cB) are
ΦA(p) = (pA − cA)DA(p) and ΦB(p) = (pB − cB)DB(p).
Lemma 1 characterizes Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of H(cA, cB).
Lemma 1 Let cA, cB < τ. The game H(cA, cB) has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let
pi(cA, cB), Di(cA, cB) and Φi(cA, cB) be the SPNE price, market share and profit of firm i:
(i) pA = τ + (2cA + cB)/3, pB = τ + (cA + 2cB)/3.
(ii) DA = 1/2− (cA − cB)/6τ, DB = 1−DA = 1/2 + (cA − cB)/6τ.
(iii) ΦA = (3τ − cA + cB)2/18τ, ΦB = (3τ + cA − cB)2/18τ.
Proof See the Appendix.
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4 Three contractual settings
4.1 No contracts between A and B
When there are no contracts between firms A and B in the intermediate good market η, the
unit cost of producing η is c for firm A and c for firm B. Accordingly, the Hotelling duopoly
game H(c, c) is played between A and B in the market ϕ. Denote
θ ≡ (2c+ c)/3 and θ ≡ (c+ 2c)/3 (5)
Observe that c < θ < θ < c.
Proposition 1 When there are no contracts between firms A and B, the Hotelling duopoly
game H(c, c) is played. This game has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let p0i , D0i and Φ0i be
the SPNE price, demand and profit of firm i. Then
(i) p0A = τ + θ, p
0
B = τ + θ;
(ii) D0A = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ, D0B = 1−D0A = 1/2 + (c− c)/6τ ;
(iii) Φ0A = (3τ − c+ c)2/18τ, Φ0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ.
Proof Follows from Lemma 1 by taking cA = c and cB = c.
4.2 Outsourcing contract between A and B
When there is an outsourcing contract between A and B, firm A has two options of acquiring
the intermediate good η: (i) it can order η from firm B or (ii) it can produce it in-house at
unit cost c. We do not impose any exclusivity restriction on outsourcing contracts. That is,
firm A can order η from firm B as well as produce it in-house. Firm B produces its required
η entirely by itself at unit cost c.
We consider linear unit pricing contracts: firm B charges a constant price for each unit
of η that it supplies to firm A. The unit price is determined through negotiations between
firms A and B. Under outsourcing contracts, the strategic interaction between A and B is
described as follows.
Negotiation stage: In the beginning, firms A and B negotiate9 on the unit price ω at
which B can supply η to A. As firm A can produce η itself at unit cost c, an outsourcing
contract can lower its cost of production only if ω < c. Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c, it
obtains a positive profit as a supplier only if ω > c. For this reason, we restrict ω ∈ (c, c).
If firms do not agree on a price, firm A produces the required η entirely by itself at cost c
and the game H(c, c) is played in the final good market. If firms agree on a price ω ∈ (c, c),
the game ΓS(ω) is played between A and B.
The game ΓS(ω): It is an extensive form game that has the following stages.
9Instead of explicitly modeling the bargaining process through which A and B determine ω, we completely
characterize the outcomes for all possible values of ω. The solution of a particular bargaining process with
specific bargaining powers of A and B can be immediately obtained from our conclusions. See Section 5.2.
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Stage I: Firm A chooses the amount K ∈ [0, 1] of η to order10 from firm B. Firm A receives
K units of η by paying ωK to firm B and B obtains the supplier profit (ω − c)K.
Stage II: Firms A,B play the Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c) that has the following
stages.
Stage 1: Firms A,B simultaneously announce prices pA, pB for the final good market ϕ.
For any p ≡ (pA, pB), the demand received by firm i ∈ {A,B} is Di(p), given by (3).
Stage 2: Observing Di(p), firms A,B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
As A already has K units of η from stage 1, its demand fulfilling constraint is
K + qA ≥ DA(p) (6)
As firm B produces η entirely by itself, the corresponding constraint for B is
qB ≥ DB(p) (7)
Each firm fulfills its demand, profits are realized and the game terminates.
Since the unit cost of producing η is positive for each firm, by (7), optimality requires that
firm B produces qB = DB(p) units of η and transforms DB(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its
demand.
By (6), if DA(p) ≤ K (firm A’s demand does not exceed the amount of η it has ordered
from B), then it is optimal for A to choose qA = 0, (i.e., it does not produce η in-house) and
transform DA(p) units of η to ϕ. If DA(p) > K, it is optimal to choose qA = DA(p) − K
(i.e., firm A produces exactly the additional amount of η that it needs to meet its demand)
and transform DA(p) units of η to ϕ. Therefore, qA = max{0, DA(p)−K}.
Payoffs of firms in ΓS(ω): We can write the payoffs of firms by using the optimal
values of qA, qB. Firm B’s payoff has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost
of producing qB units of η to fulfill its demand and (iii) profit from supplying K units of η
to A at price ω. Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c and qB = DB(p), its payoff is
piωB(K, p) = pBDB(p)− cqB + (ω − c)K = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)K (8)
Firm A’s payoff also has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost of producing
qA units of η in-house to fulfill its demand and (iii) its payment to firm B for acquiring K
units of η at price ω. Since firm A’s unit cost of η is c and qA = max{0, DA(p) − K}, its
payoff is
piωA(K, p) = pADA(p)− cqA−ωK =
{
pADA(p)− ωK if DA(p) ≤ K
pADA(p)− c(DA(p)−K)− ωK if DA(p) > K (9)
We determine SPNE of ΓS(ω) by backward induction. So we begin from stage II.
10Since the maximum demand that a firm can have is 1, there is no loss of generality in restricting K ≤ 1. In
our model firms A and B negotiate on the price ω and then A chooses the outsourcing order K. Alternatively,
one can allow A and B to negotiate on both ω and K. Our qualitative conclusions remain unaltered under
this alternative.
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4.2.1 Stage II of ΓS(ω): The Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c)
The game HK(c, c) can be viewed as a Hotelling duopoly game in which firm A has built a
“capacity” of K prior to the game.11 Specifically, in this game:
(i) Firm B has constant unit cost c.
(ii) Firm A has capacity K which is commonly known between A and B. If the demand
received by A does not exceed K, it can fulfill the demand at zero unit cost. However,
if its demand exceeds K, A has to incur the cost c for every additional unit.
Observe from (9) that for firm A, ωK is the cost of capacity K that it pays upfront to firm
B before stage II, so ωK plays no role from stage II onwards. From (9), firm A’s profit in
HK(c, c) is
ΦKA (p) =
{
pADA(p) if DA(p) ≤ K
pADA(p)− c(DA(p)−K) = (pA − c)DA(p) + cK if DA(p) > K (10)
Therefore, firm A has unit cost zero if DA(p) ≤ K, while its effective unit cost is c > 0 if
DA(p) > K. It follows from (8) that (ω−c)K is the profit that firm B obtains upfront before
stage II and it plays no role thereafter. Ignoring these terms, from (8), firm B’s profit in
HK(c, c) is
ΦKB (p) = (pB − c)DB(p) (11)
Lemma 2 characterizes SPNE of the Hotelling duopoly game HK(c, c). Recall that for
i ∈ {A,B}, pi(cA, cB), Di(cA, cB) and Φi(cA, cB) denote the SPNE price, market share and
profit of firm i in the standard Hotelling game H(cA, cB).
Lemma 2HK(c, c) has a unique SPNE that has the following properties, where pKA , pKB denote
the prices and ΦKA ,Φ
K
B the profits of firms A,B in the SPNE.
(i) If K < DA(c, c), the prices and market shares of firms are the same as in the SPNE of
H(c, c), ΦKA = ΦA(c, c) + cK and ΦKB = ΦB(c, c). Firm A fully utilizes its capacity K
and in addition produces DA(c, c)−K units of η in-house to fulfill its demand.
(ii) If K > DA(0, c), the prices, market shares and profits of firms are the same as in the
SPNE of H(0, c). Firm A does not utilize K − DA(0, c) units of its capacity and does
not produce η in-house.
(iii) If K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)],
pKA = 3τ + c− 4τK and pKB = 2τ + c− 2τK (12)
The market share of firm A is K, that of firm B is 1 − K, ΦKA = pKAK and ΦKB =(
pKB − c
)
(1−K). Firm A fully utilizes its capacity K and does not produce η in-house.
(iv) The prices pKA , p
K
B and the profits Φ
K
A ,Φ
K
B are continuous in K.
11When K = 0, HK(c, c) becomes the standard Hotelling duopoly game H(c, c).
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Proof See the Appendix.
Observe that in the game HK(c, c), firm B’s unit cost is always c. For firm A, the
minimum possible unit cost is 0 while the maximum possible unit cost is c. Therefore, in an
SPNE of HK(c, c) the maximum market share that firm A can have is DA(0, c) (its SPNE
market share in the standard Hotelling game H(0, c)), while the minimum market share that
it can have is DA(c, c) (the corresponding market share in H(c, c)).
Lemma 2 shows that if the capacity of firm A is too small [K < DA(c, c)], building such
a capacity gives A no strategic advantage in HK(c, c) and the game yields the same SPNE
outcome as H(c, c). On the other hand, if the capacity is too large [K > DA(0, c)], the game
results in the same SPNE outcome as H(0, c) where part of the capacity remains unutilized
(given positive cost of capacity, it is clear that building such large capacity cannot be optimal
for firm A). Intermediate capacities [DA(c, c) ≤ K ≤ DA(0, c)] have a commitment value in
that for these values of K, the SPNE prices are such that the market share of A in HK(c, c)
exactly equals K. As a result, the capacity is fully utilized and A does not produce η in-
house. Such intermediate capacities have the effect of establishing firm A as the Stackelberg
leader in the final good market.
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Figure 1: Hotelling Meets Stackelberg
Ap Ap Ap
Figure 1 illustrates this Stackelberg effect. It identifies the SPNE (pKA , p
K
B ) of HK(c, c)
for different values of K. Since firm B’s unit cost is always c, its best response is the same
as in a standard Hotelling game, given by the line B1B2. Firm A’s unit cost depends on its
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demand and its best response is a piecewise linear function that has three segments. If B’s
price pB is relatively small, A’s best response is the same as in the standard Hotelling game
H(0, c), given by A1A2. On the other hand, if pB is relatively large, A’s best response is the
same as in H(c, c), given by A3A4. For intermediate values of pB, its best response A2A3 is
such that the demand it receives is exactly equal to its capacity K.
Figure 1(a) corresponds to the case K < DA(c, c). For this case, B1B2 intersects the
best response of A at the segment A3A4. The SPNE is the same as in H(c, c). Figure 1(b)
corresponds to the case K > DA(0, c) where B1B2 intersects the best response of A at the
segment A1A2 and the SPNE is the same as in H(0, c). Figure 1(c) corresponds to K ∈
[DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]. For this case B1B2 intersects the best response of A at the intermediate
segment A2A3. The SPNE (p
K
A , p
K
B ) is such that firm A’s market share exactly equals its
capacity K, effectively establishing firm A as the Stackelberg leader in the Hotelling duopoly.
This is where Hotelling meets Stackelberg.
4.2.2 Stage I of ΓS(ω)
Now we move back to stage I of ΓS(ω) where firm A chooses its outsourcing order K ∈ [0, 1]
of η. For any such K, the game HK(c, c) is played in stage II whose unique SPNE is given
in Lemma 2. Let ΦKA be the SPNE profit of firm A in HK(c, c). In any SPNE play of ΓS(ω),
when firm A orders K units of η from firm B in stage I, its payoff is ΦKA − ωK (its SPNE
profit in HK(c, c) net of its payment ωK that it makes to firm B). By Lemma 2, the payoff
of A is
piωA(K) =

ΦA(c, c) + cK − ωK if K < DA(c, c)
pKAK − ωK if K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]
ΦA(0, c)− ωK if K > DA(0, c)
(13)
The payoff of firm B is its SPNE profit in HK(c, c) plus its input supplier profit (ω − c)K.
By Lemma 2, this payoff is
piωB(K) =

ΦB(c, c) + (ω − c)K if K < DA(c, c)(
pKB − c
)
(1−K) + (ω − c)K if K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)]
ΦB(0, c) + (ω − c)K if K > DA(0, c)
(14)
Observe that both functions above are continuous in K. To determine SPNE of ΓS(ω), in
stage I, we solve the single-person decision problem of firm A which is to choose K ∈ [0, 1]
to maximize piωA(K) given by (13). In the next proposition we show the existence of SPNE
of game ΓS(ω) and two useful general properties of any SPNE.
Proposition 2 For any ω ∈ (c, c), SPNE of ΓS(ω) exists. The following hold at any SPNE.
(I) The market share of firm A in the final good market ϕ exactly equals the quantity of
η that it orders from firm B. Consequently firm A fully utilizes the amount of η that
it orders from B and does not produce η in-house.
(II) Compared to no contracts, firm A is better off and no consumer is worse off.
Proof Since ω < c and ω > 0, note from (13) that piω(K) is increasing for K ≤ DA(c, c)
and decreasing for K ≥ DA(0, c). So firm A’s problem in stage 1 reduces to choosing
K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] to maximize the continuous function piω(K). As this problem has a
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solution, SPNE of ΓS(ω) exists. By Lemma 2(iii) it follows that in any SPNE, the market
share of firm A equals K, which proves (I).
Observe from (13) that by choosing K = DA(c, c) in stage 1, firm A obtains more than
ΦA(c, c), which is its payoff under no contracts. As firm A chooses K optimally in any SPNE,
it must obtain more than its no-contract payoff.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the prices p0A, p
0
B under no contracts coincide with the
corresponding SPNE prices of H(c, c). By Lemma 2 ((i) and (iv)), if K = DA(c, c) then
pKA = p
0
A and p
K
B = p
0
B. As K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] in any SPNE and pKA , pKB are both
decreasing functions of K in this interval (Lemma 2(ii)), it follows that pKA ≤ p0A and pKB ≤ p0B
in any SPNE, proving that no consumer is worse off.
Remark 1 Proposition 2 shows that prices in the final good market under outsourcing never
rise above their no-contract levels. This result is in sharp contrast with the conclusion of the
literature of horizontal outsourcing under price competition (e.g., Shy and Stenbacka, 2003;
Chen et al., 2004; Arya et al., 2008).
Remark 2 As the equilibrium market share of firm A exactly equals the volume of A’s
outsourcing order, there is no unutilized capacity. This implies that even if the outsourcing
contract includes the option of returning any unused good, this option will not be exercised
in equilibrium. This result is particularly useful when our model is applied to a retail market
duopoly, as input contracts in such markets are likely to include a return policy for unused
goods.
Proposition 3 completely characterizes SPNE of ΓS(ω) and gives more specific properties.
Proposition 3 For any ω ∈ (c, c), ΓS(ω) has a unique SPNE. Let K(ω) be the amount of η
that firm A orders from firm B and for i ∈ {A,B}, let pSi (ω), DSi (ω) and ΠSi (ω) be the price,
market share and payoff of firm i in the SPNE. The SPNE has the following properties.
(I) Let c− c > (3/4)τ. There is ĉ ∈ (c, c) such that
(a) If ω ∈ (c, ĉ), then K(ω) = Θ(ω) := 3/8 − (ω − c)/8τ ∈ (DA(c, c), DA(0, c)) . The
market share of firm A is Θ(ω) and that of firm B is 1 − Θ(ω). The prices are
increasing in ω, given by
pSA(ω) = (3τ + c+ ω)/2 < p
0
A and p
S
B(ω) = (5τ + 3c+ ω)/4 < p
0
B (15)
All consumers are better off compared to no contracts. The payoffs are
ΠSA(ω) = p
S
A(ω)Θ(ω)−ωΘ(ω) and ΠSB(ω) =
(
pSA(ω)− c
)
(1−Θ(ω))+(ω − c) Θ(ω)
There is c˜ ∈ (c, ĉ) such that ΠSB(ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T c˜, i.e., compared to no contracts,
firm B is better off only if and only if ω ∈ (c˜, ĉ).
(b) If ω ∈ [ĉ, c), then K(ω) = DA(c, c) = D0A. The prices and market shares of firms
are exactly the same as in the case of no contracts. The payoffs are
ΠSA(ω) = Φ
0
A + (c− ω)D0A and ΠSB(ω) = Φ0B + (ω − c)D0A
Compared to no contracts, both firms are better off and consumers are neither
better off nor worse off.
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(c) An outsourcing contract is strictly Pareto improving (both firms and all consumers
are better off) if ω ∈ (c˜, ĉ) and weakly Pareto improving (both firms are better off
and no consumer is worse off) if ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
(II) Let c− c ≤ (3/4)τ. Then for any ω ∈ (c, c), K(ω) = DA(c, c) and the conclusion is the
same as in (I)(b). Consequently an outsourcing contract is weakly Pareto improving
for all ω ∈ (c, c).
(III) ΠSA(ω) is decreasing and Π
S
B(ω) is increasing in ω. Define
c∗ :=
{
c˜ if c− c > (3/4)τ
c if c− c ≤ (3/4)τ (16)
Compared to no contracts, both firms are better off if and only if ω ∈ (c∗, c).
Proof See the Appendix.
To see the intuition for Proposition 3, recall that firm A’s outsourcing order of η is
equivalent to an endogenous capacity built by A prior to price competition which establishes
firm A as the Stackelberg leader in the market ϕ. When ω (the unit cost of building capacity)
is relatively large, the Stackelberg leader market share coincides with A’s market share
under no contracts. Then firm A does not utilize its leadership advantage since capacity
building is relatively costly (Prop 3(I)(b)). On the other hand, when ω is relatively small,
the Stackelberg leader market share is larger than A’s market share under no contracts. In
such a case, capacity building is relatively less expensive which enables firm A to utilize its
leadership advantage (Prop 3(I)(a)). The Stackelberg leader market share is sustained in
equilibrium by a lower price of firm A. Equilibrium reasoning implies that that B’s price is
also set lower. This results in lower profit for firm B in the market ϕ compared to the case
of no contracts. It is acceptable to B only if it can recover its losses in the market ϕ from its
supplier profit in the market η, which could be the case only when B is significantly more
efficient compared to A in the production of η. Consequently, if the cost difference of two
firms is sufficiently large [specifically, c − c > (3/4)τ ], there are strictly Pareto improving
outsourcing contracts: consumers are better off since prices of both firms fall, firm A is better
off due to its Stackelberg leadership advantage and firm B is also better off since its supplier
profit from market η more than offsets its losses from market ϕ.
4.3 Technology transfer contract between A and B
When firm B transfers its superior technology to firm A, both A and B can produce the
intermediate good η at lower cost c. As in the case of outsourcing contract, we consider linear
unit pricing contracts. The unit pricing contract for technology transfer is the unit royalty
contract where the rate of royalty is denoted by r. The strategic interaction between A and
B under technology transfer is described as follows.12
12The analysis of this section is similar to Matsumura et al. (2010) who consider the problem of technology
transfer via royalty licensing between firms that compete in a Hotelling duopoly with endogenous locations.
However, their primary objective is to determine the optimal royalty for the firm with superior technology
(and then resolve the equilibrium existence problem), while we characterize the market outcomes for all ω,
which are then compared with the corresponding outcomes under outsourcing.
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Negotiation stage: In the beginning, firms A and B negotiate on the unit royalty r.
Under the unit royalty contract, firm A uses the superior technology of firm B. In return, A
pays B the royalty r for each unit of η that it produces using the superior technology. So,
firm A’s effective unit cost of η is c + r. As A can produce η itself at unit cost c, a royalty
contract can lower its cost of production only if c+ r < c or r < c− c. On the other hand,
firm B can obtain a positive revenue from technology transfer only if r > 0. So we restrict
r ∈ (0, c− c).
To compare royalty contracts with outsourcing contracts, it will be convenient to denote
ω ≡ c + r. Then ω represents the effective unit cost of η for firm A under the superior
technology, while r = ω − c represents the unit profit of firm B from technology transfer.
Since r ∈ (0, c− c), we have ω ∈ (c, c).
If firms do not agree on a price, firm A produces the required η entirely by itself at cost c
and the game H(c, c) is played in the final good market. If firms agree on a price ω ∈ (c, c),
firm B transfers its superior technology to firm A and the game ΓT (ω) is played between
firms A and B.
Remark 3 Observe that the interpretation of ω is the same as in outsourcing contracts.
For firm A, ω is the unit cost of obtaining η from firm B. For firm B, (ω − c) is the unit
profit from supplying η to A. The difference between outsourcing and technology transfer
is that under outsourcing, A chooses the quantity of η and places its order with B before
firms set their prices for the final good market ϕ. Firm B produces η using its superior
technology and supplies η to A at price ω. In contrast, under technology transfer, A uses
the superior technology to produce η itself after prices are set and its demand is known.
This difference, which is generally overlooked in the existing literature, alters the strategic
interaction and affects the prices of the final good ϕ.
The game ΓT (ω): It is an extensive form game that has the following stages.
Stage I: Firms A and B simultaneously announce prices pA, pB for the final good market
ϕ. For any p ≡ (pA, pB), the demand received by firm i ∈ {A,B} is Di(p), given by (3).
Stage II: Observing Di(p), firms A and B simultaneously choose qA, qB ≥ 0 where
qi = the quantity of η that firm i produces in order to fulfill its demand of ϕ
The demand fulfilling constraints for firms A, B are
qA ≥ DA(p) and qB ≥ DB(p) (17)
Each firm fulfills its demand, profits are realized, firm A makes its royalty payments to
firm B and the game terminates.
If firm A produces η using its pre-contract inferior technology, its unit cost is c. If it produces
η using the superior technology, its unit cost is ω < c. So it is optimal for firm A to produce
η entirely using the superior technology. Firm B’s unit cost of producing η is c > 0. Since
both ω and c are positive, by (17), optimality requires that for i ∈ {A,B}, firm i produces
qi = Di(p) units of η and transforms Di(p) units to good ϕ to fulfill its demand.
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Payoffs of firms in ΓT (ω): Using optimal values of qA, qB, we can write the payoff of
each firm. Firm A’s payoff has two components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) total effective
cost of producing qA units of η to fulfill its demand. Observe that this total effective cost is
(c + r)qA = ωqA, so it includes firm A’s royalty payments to firm B. As qA = DA(p), the
payoff of firm A is
piωA(p) = pADA(p)− ωqA = (pA − ω)DA(p) (18)
Firm B’s payoff has three components: (i) revenue from market ϕ, (ii) cost of producing
qB units of η to fulfill its demand and (iii) profit from technology transfer rqA = (ω − c)qA.
Since firm B’s unit cost of η is c and qi = Di(p), its payoff is
piωB(p) = pBDB(p)− cqB + (ω − c)qA = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)DA(p)
From (3), DA(p) +DB(p) = 1. Using this in the expression above, the payoff of firm B is
piωB(p) = (pB − c)DB(p) + (ω − c)(1−DB(p)) = (pB − ω)DB(p) + (ω − c) (19)
Since (ω − c) is a constant, from (19) it follows that, firm B in effect solves the problem
of a firm that has unit cost ω. By (18), firm A has unit cost ω. Therefore, firms A and
B effectively play the Hotelling duopoly game H(ω, ω) and SPNE of ΓT (ω) coincides with
SPNE of H(ω, ω) with the only modification that firm B’s payoff has an additional constant
(ω − c).
Proposition 4 For any ω ∈ (c, c), ΓT (ω) has a unique SPNE. For i ∈ {A,B}, let pTi (ω),
DTi (ω) and Π
T
i (ω) be the price, market share and payoff of firm i in the SPNE Γ
T (ω). The
SPNE has the following properties.
(I) The prices and market shares of firms are the same as in the SPNE of H(ω, ω). Each
firm sets the same price τ + ω and obtains the same market share 1/2. The payoffs
are ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 and Π
T
B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c), i.e., ΠTA(ω) is a constant and ΠTB(ω) is
increasing in ω.
(II) ΠTA(ω) > Φ
0
A, i.e., compared to no contracts, firm A is better off.
(III) There are constants c < θ < θ̂ < θ < c such that
(a) Compared to no contracts, all consumers are better off if ω ∈ (c, θ) and all con-
sumers are worse off if ω ∈ (θ, c). If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then ∃ λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that
consumers at location x ∈ [0, λ] are better off and x ∈ (λ, 1] are worse off.
(b) ΠTB(ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T θ̂, i.e., compared to no contracts firm B is better off (and
consequently both firms are better off) if and only if ω ∈ (θ̂, c).
(c) Whenever both firms prefer technology transfer over no contracts [i.e., if ω ∈ (θ̂, c)],
there are always some consumers who prefer no contracts over technology transfer.
Consequently, there is no technology transfer contract that is Pareto improving
(i.e., making both firms as well as all consumers better off).
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Proof Using the conclusion from the paragraph preceding the proposition and taking cA =
cB = ω in Lemma 1, part (I) follows. Part (II) follows directly from part (I) and Proposition
1(iii). See the Appendix for the proof of part (III).
To see the intuition for Proposition 4, first observe that in contrast to the case of out-
sourcing, firm B does not receive its revenue from technology transfer upfront. It is received
after the price competition stage in the form of royalty payments. To obtain relatively large
royalty payments from technology transfer, B has an incentive to ensure that A’s share in
the market ϕ is not too small. This has a distortive effect which causes B’s effective unit
cost to rise to ω > c [see (19)]. As A’s unit cost falls to ω < c, firm A has an efficiency gain
while B has an efficiency loss. The resulting effect on consumers depends on which one of
these opposing factors dominates. When ω is sufficiently small (ω < θ), the efficiency gain of
A dominates, prices of both firms fall and all consumers are better off. When ω is sufficiently
large (ω > θ), the efficiency loss of B dominates, prices of both firms rise and all consumers
are worse off. For intermediate values of ω (ω ∈ [θ, θ]), the effect on consumers is ambiguous
and it depends on their location. Consumers who are close to A (x < λ) benefit from the
efficiency gain of A and therefore are better off. In contrast, consumers who are close to B
(x ≥ λ) are adversely affected by the efficiency loss of B and are worse off (Prop 4(III)(a)).
Observe that all consumers are better off under technology transfer compared to no
contract only if ω is sufficiently small (ω < θ). However, when ω is small, B obtains a lower
revenue from royalty. For this reason, firm B prefers technology transfer over no contract
only if ω is relatively large, in which case there are always some consumers who are worse off.
This explains why there is no Pareto improving technology transfer contract (Prop 4(III)(c)).
5 Outsourcing versus technology transfer
Having characterized the outcomes of outsourcing and technology transfer games, in this
section we compare these two contracts from the points of view of the two firms as well as
the consumers.
5.1 Comparison of contracts with same ω
Recall that under both outsourcing and technology transfer, ω is firm A’s effective unit
cost of obtaining η and (ω − c) is firm B’s unit profit from the market η. Proposition 5
compares these two contracts by keeping ω fixed across contracts, so that the effects of
cost efficiency (for firm A) and supplier profits (for firm B) are the same across contracts.
Therefore this proposition identifies the differences between these two contracts that are
purely driven by the salient strategic aspects of these contracts: the Stackelberg leadership
effect for outsourcing and the distortive effect for technology transfer.
Proposition 5 Let ω ∈ (c, c). There are constants c < α < β < c and c < θ < θ < c such
that the following hold.
(I) If ω ∈ (c, α), both firms prefer outsourcing and if ω ∈ (β, c), both firms prefer technol-
ogy transfer. If ω ∈ [α, β], then firm A prefers technology transfer while firm B prefers
outsourcing.
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(II) If ω ∈ (c, θ), all consumers prefer technology transfer and if ω ∈ (θ, c), all consumers
prefer outsourcing. If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then ∃ λ(ω) ∈ (0, 1/2] such that consumers at location
x ∈ [0, λ] prefer technology transfer while consumers at x ∈ (λ, 1] prefer outsourcing.
(III) The following inequalities hold: c < α < θ < β < θ. Consequently whenever both firms
prefer a specific contract, there always exist some consumers who prefer the other
contract. Specifically
(a) Both firms prefer outsourcing if and only if ω < α. In that case all consumers
prefer technology transfer.
(b) Both firms prefer technology transfer if and only if ω > β. In that case there
always exist some consumers who prefer outsourcing. Moreover if ω > θ, then all
consumers prefer outsourcing.
Proof See the Appendix.
Firm A’s payoff under technology transfer is a constant τ/2, while its payoff under out-
sourcing is decreasing in ω. This is why A prefers outsourcing for relatively small values
of ω and technology transfer otherwise. Firm B’s payoff has profits from two markets: the
final good ϕ and the intermediate good η. We know that under technology transfer, there
is a distortive effect that raises the effective cost of B. As a result, the profit of B in ϕ is
lower under technology transfer than outsourcing. Therefore, if B is solely interested in the
profits from the market ϕ, it would prefer outsourcing. On the other hand, if B is only
interested in the profits from the market η, it would prefer technology transfer since its sup-
plier profit from η increases with the market share of A, which is higher under technology
transfer. This trade-off is settled by the magnitude of ω. When ω is relatively small, the
profit from η does not contribute significantly to B’s payoff. As a result the effect of the
market ϕ dominates and B prefers outsourcing. When ω is relatively large, the profit from
η contributes significantly to B’s payoff, so it prefers technology transfer.
For relatively large values of ω, prices under outsourcing are the same as in the case of no
contracts, but prices under technology transfer exceed the no contract levels. Accordingly,
all consumers prefer outsourcing for relatively large values of ω. For relatively small values of
ω, prices under outsourcing may fall, but prices under technology transfer fall significantly
below the no contract levels. Consequently all consumers prefer technology transfer for
relatively small values of ω. For intermediate values of ω, the price of firm A falls while the
price of B rises under technology transfer. As a result, the preference of consumers depends
on their location as in Proposition 4.
Finally it is shown in Proposition 5 that the interest of consumers and incentives of firms
conflict each other. Whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, there always exist
some consumers who prefer the other one.
5.2 Comparison of contracts under bargaining
In the last section we compared the outcomes of outsourcing and technology transfer by
keeping the price ω same across the two contracts. However, if firms A,B bargain to choose
ω under each form of contract, the chosen value may not be the same for outsourcing and
technology transfer. In this section we see if our conclusions are robust to the case where the
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choice of ω is decided through bargaining between the two firms. Instead of explicitly spec-
ifying the bargaining process, we take a more general approach by imposing certain natural
efficiency requirements on the contracts. The starting point is the notion of undominated
contracts which is defined as follows.
Definition Consider a specific form of contract (outsourcing or technology transfer) and let
ω ∈ [c, c]. We say ω is undominated if
(i) no firm is worse off at ω compared to no contracts,
(ii) there is no ω′ ∈ [c, c] such that (a) no firm is worse off and (b) at least one firm is
better off at ω′ compared to ω.
We assume that for any form of contract, firms bargain over only those ω that are
undominated. To identify this set observe that:
(1) There is a constant c∗ ∈ [c, c) such that both firms prefer outsourcing over no contracts
if and only if ω ∈ (c∗, c) (Prop 3).
(2) There is a constant θ̂ ∈ (c, c) such that both firms prefer technology transfer over no
contracts if and only if ω ∈ (θ̂, c) (Prop 4).
Let US be the set of all undominated contracts for outsourcing and UT be the corre-
sponding set for technology transfer. Denote the bargaining power of firm B by γ ∈ (0, 1),
so that the bargaining power of firm A is 1 − γ. Let ωS(γ) be the value of ω chosen under
outsourcing when B has bargaining power γ and ωT (γ) be the corresponding value under
technology transfer.
• Outsourcing: From (1) above, US ⊆ [c∗, c]. Since ΠSA(ω) is decreasing and ΠSB(ω) is in-
creasing in ω (Prop 3), it follows that any ω ∈ [c∗, c] is undominated, so that US = [c∗, c].
We assume that ωS(γ) : (0, 1) → [c∗, c] is a continuous and increasing function with
limγ→0 ωS(γ) = c∗ and limγ→1 ωS(γ) = c. This specification implies that a firm obtains a
higher payoff as its bargaining power increases and as a firm’s bargaining power becomes
close to 1, its payoff approaches the maximum possible payoff it can obtain in the set US.
• Technology transfer: From (2) above, UT ⊆ [θ̂, c]. Since ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 is a constant and
ΠTB(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c) is increasing in ω (Prop 4), it follows that ω = c is the only
undominated contract,13 i.e., UT = {c}. Therefore ωT (γ) = c for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
For γ ∈ (0, 1) and i ∈ {A,B}, let ΨSi (γ) be the payoff and ρSi (γ) be the price of firm i
under the outsourcing contract that is chosen when firm B’s bargaining power is γ, i.e.,
ΨSi (γ) = Π
S
i (ω
S(γ)) and ρSi (γ) = p
S
i (ω
S(γ)) (20)
Let ΨTi (γ) and ρ
T
i (γ) be the corresponding expressions under technology transfer. Noting
that ωT (γ) = c for all γ ∈ (0, 1) and pTi (c) = τ + c (Prop 4), we have
ΨTi (γ) = Π
T
i (ω
T (γ)) = ΠTi (c) and ρ
T
i (γ) = p
T
i (ω
T (γ)) = pTi (c) = τ + c (21)
Proposition 6
13When ω = c, firm A’s effective cost under the superior technology is the same as its cost with its own
technology. However, firm A obtains Π0A if it uses its own technology, while it obtains τ/2 > Π
0
A by accepting
a technology transfer contract with ω = c. So firm A will accept a technology transfer contract with ω = c.
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(I) ΨTB(γ) > Ψ
S
B(γ) for all γ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., firm B always prefers technology transfer over
outsourcing.
(II) For i ∈ {A,B}, ρTi (γ) > ρSi (γ) for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Consequently all consumers always
prefer outsourcing over technology transfer.
(III) ∃ γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that ΨSA(γ) T ΨTA(γ) if and only if γ S γ∗, i.e., firm A prefers out-
sourcing if B’s bargaining power is relatively small (γ < γ∗) and it prefers technology
transfer if B’s bargaining power is relatively large (γ > γ∗).
(IV) If γ > γ∗ then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer out-
sourcing. Otherwise all consumers and firm A prefer outsourcing while firm B prefers
technology transfer.
Proof (I) Since ΠSB(ω) is increasing in ω (Prop 3) and ω
S(γ) ≤ c, it follows from (20) that
ΨSB(γ) ≤ ΠSB(c). By (21), for all γ ∈ (0, 1), we have ΨTB(γ) = ΠTB(c). Since ΠTB(c) > ΠSB(c)
(by Prop 5(I)), it follows that ΨTB(γ) > Ψ
S
B(γ).
(II) Let i ∈ {A,B}. Since pSi (ω) ≤ p0i for all ω ∈ [c∗, c] (Prop 3) and ωS(γ) ∈ [c∗, c], it follows
from (20) that ρSi (γ) ≤ p0i for all γ ∈ (0, 1). By (21), ρTi (γ) = pTi (c) = τ + c. As p0A, p0B are
both less than τ + c (Prop 1), the result follows.
(III) Note from (20) and Prop 5(I) that ΨSA(γ) = Π
S
A(ω
S(γ)) T τ/2 = ΨTA(γ) iff ωS(γ) S α.
Since c∗ < α < c (see Lemma A4 in the Appendix) and ωS(γ) : (0, 1) → [c∗, c] is increasing
with limγ→0 ωS(γ) = c∗ and limγ→1 ωS(γ) = c, ∃ γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that ωS(γ) T α iff γ T γ∗.
Hence ΨSA(γ) T ΨTA(γ) iff γ S γ∗.
(IV) Follows from (I)-(III).
As the only undominated technology transfer contract results in maximum possible prices
for both firms, consumers always prefer outsourcing. If the bargaining power of firm B is
relatively large (γ > γ∗), both firms prefer technology transfer, resulting in conflict with the
interest of all consumers. Recall that with same ω across contracts, whenever both firms
prefer one form of contract, there always exist some consumers who prefer the other one
(Prop 5). We obtain a stronger result under bargaining: whenever both firms prefer one
form of contract, all consumers prefer the other contract. Two remarks are in order.
Remark 4 Note that the unique undominated technology transfer contract ω = c corre-
sponds to the maximum possible royalty r = c − c that firm B can charge firm A. It is
shown in Matsumura et al. (2010) that the optimal royalty policy of technology transfer for
the efficient firm is to charge the maximum royalty from its rival. Proposition 6 strengthens
their result by showing that if firm B’s bargaining power is sufficiently large, the maximum
royalty contract also dominates outsourcing contracts for both firms.
Remark 5 Suppose firms A,B are competing retailers. Then under an outsourcing contract,
the efficient retailer (firm B) manufactures for both the retailers, while under technology
transfer, both retailers are active in manufacturing. The result of Proposition 6 implies that
if the efficient retailer has sufficiently large bargaining power in determining the terms of
each contract, then it is better for both retailers that the inefficient retailer stays active
in manufacturing. Although both retailers then use the efficient process of B, there is a
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distortive effect in the form of a high transfer price ω = c in the manufacturing stage. This
enables the retailers to sustain a high retail price in the downstream market.
Let us now look at the case γ < γ∗. In this case firm A, like all consumers, also prefer
outsourcing, but firm B prefers technology transfer. A natural question is, which contract
will be chosen in such a situation? The model as it is does not immediately answer this
question. However, this ambiguity can be addressed if one extends the model by providing
more decision choices to firms. Here we provide an example of one such possible extension.
Consider an extended model where one of the firms moves first to propose a specific form of
contract (outsourcing or technology transfer) which the other firm can accept or reject. In
the case of acceptance firms implement the proposed contract where the price ω is determined
through bargaining and in case of rejection, both firms obtain their no-contract payoffs. In
this set-up, if γ < γ∗, then outsourcing will be proposed and accepted if firm A moves
first, while technology transfer will be chosen if firm B moves first. Thus, if firm A is given
sufficiently large bargaining power (γ < γ∗) and further strategic advantage as the proposer
of the contract form, then the conflict between incentives of firms and interest of consumers
can be resolved in that firms will choose a contract (i.e. outsourcing) that is preferred by all
consumers.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has compared two contracts that are frequently observed in industry practices:
outsourcing and technology transfer. Departing from the existing literature we have shown
that these two contracts generate different strategic interactions that alter incentives of firms
and affect prices. Identifying the Stackelberg leadership effect in a Hotelling duopoly model,
we have shown that there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts. In contrast,
there are no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. We have also shown that there
is generally a conflict between the incentives of firms and interest of consumers.
In this paper the locations of firms are exogenously given at the two end points of the
Hotelling linear city. A natural extension would be to endogenize the location choices. This
will raise some interesting theoretical issues in view of three results of the existing literature:
(i) pure strategy equilibrium fail to exist if there is sufficient cost asymmetry between firms
(Ziss, 1993), (ii) there is a mixed strategy equilibrium where firms randomly choose to locate
at two end points (Matsumura and Matsushima, 2009) and (iii) technology transfer through
royalty can restore existence of pure strategy equilibrium (Matsumura et al., 2010).
The choice of endogenous locations is also of interest when the firms are retailers and
a location corresponds to a specific product characteristic. Our existing model applies to
retail markets where retailers, located at two end points, have exogenous product character-
istic that are very different. Making the location choices endogenous will enable us to see
if competing retailers who interact in the input market have incentive to choose similar or
different features for their products. In particular, if the retailers choose the same charac-
teristic it will imply that the two retailers effectively become two franchisees of the same
product. Thus, endogenizing location choices may be useful to understand some aspects of
franchising. These questions are left for future research.
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Appendix
We begin with Lemma A1 which will be used to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma A1 Let cA, cB < τ. The following hold in the game H(cA, cB):
(i) Let i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j. The best response of firm i to firm j’s price pj is
bci(pj) =
{
(pj + τ + ci)/2 if pj ≤ 3τ + ci
pj − τ if pj > 3τ + ci (22)
(ii) If (pA, pB) is an SPNE of H(cA, cB), then pA ≤ 3τ + cB and pB ≤ 3τ + cA.
Proof (i) By (3), if pi ≤ pj−τ , then Di = 1 and i’s payoff is pi−ci, which is increasing in pi.
If pi ≥ pj+τ, then Di = 0 and i’s payoff is zero. Therefore, to determine best response of i, it
is sufficient to consider pi ∈ [pj−τ, pj +τ ]. In that case, by (2) and (3), Di = (pj−pi+τ)/2τ
and i’s payoff is Φi = (pi − ci)(pj − pi + τ)/2τ. The unconstrained maximum of Φi with
respect to pi is attained at b(pj) = (pj + τ + ci)/2. As ci < τ, we have b(pj) < pj + τ. Noting
that b(pj) ≥ pj − τ iff pj ≤ 3τ + ci and pj − τ > 0 for pj > 3τ + ci, the result in (22) follows.
(ii) Suppose (pA, pB) is an SPNE and pj > 3τ + ci for some i, j ∈ {A,B} and i 6= j.
Then by (22), pi = bci(pj) = pj − τ. In that case, Dj = 0 and firm j obtains zero payoff.
Let j deviate to set the price p′j = pi = pj − τ . Following this deviation, by (2) and (3),
firm j will receive demand 1/2 and payoff (pj − cj)/2. Since pj > 3τ + ci > τ > cj, firm
j’s post-deviation payoff is positive, showing that j has improved its payoff following the
deviation, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1 By Lemma A1(ii), to find SPNE of H(cA, cB), it is sufficient to consider
pA ≤ 3τ + cB and pB ≤ 3τ + cA. Then by (22), the best response of A is to set pA =
(pB + τ + cA)/2 and that of B is to set pB = (pA + τ + cB)/2. The system of best response
equations has a unique solution: pA = τ + (2cA + cB)/3 and pB = τ + (cA + 2cB)/3. This
proves (i). Parts (ii)-(iii) follow directly from (i).
Lemma A2 will be used to prove Lemma 2.
Lemma A2 Denote p ≡ (pA, pB), g(pB) := pB + τ − 2τK, p(K) := 4τK − τ and p(K) :=
4τK − τ + c. In the game HK(c, c):
(i) DA(p) S K ⇔ pA T g(pB).
(ii) The profit of firm A is
ΦKA (p) =

pA − c+ cK if pA < pB − τ
(pA − c)(pB − pA + τ)/2τ + cK if pB − τ ≤ pA < g(pB)
pA(pB − pA + τ)/2τ if g(pB) ≤ pA ≤ pB + τ
0 if pA > pB + τ
(23)
(iii) The best response of A to B’s price pB is
bKA (pB) =

b0(pB) = (pB + τ)/2 if pB < p
g(pB) if p ≤ pB ≤ p
bc(pB) = (pB + τ + c)/2 if p < pB ≤ 3τ + c
bc(pB) = pB − τ if pB > 3τ + c
(24)
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(iv) Consider the demand that firm A receives when it sets price pA = b
K
A (pB). This demand
is less than K if pB < p, more than K if pB > p and exactly equals K if p ≤ pB ≤ p.
(v) The profit of firm B is
ΦKB (p) =

pB − c if pB < pA − τ
(pB − c)(pA − pB + τ)/2τ if pA − τ ≤ pB ≤ pA + τ
0 if pB > pA + τ
(25)
(vi) The best response of B to A’s price pA is
bKB (pA) = bc(pA) =
{
(pA + τ + c)/2 if pA ≤ 3τ + c
pA − τ if pA > 3τ + c (26)
(vii) If (pA, pB) is an SPNE of HK(c, c), then pA ≤ 3τ + c and pB ≤ 3τ + c.
Proof (i) Observe that since K ∈ [0, 1], we have pB − τ ≤ g(pB) ≤ pB + τ. It follows from
(3) that if pA ≤ pB − τ, then DA(p) = 1 ≥ K and if pA ≥ pB + τ, then DA(p) = 0 ≤ K. Now
consider pA ∈ [pB − τ, pB + τ ]. Then from (2) and (3), we have DA(p) = (pB − pA + τ)/2τ S
K ⇔ pA T g(pB). This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Observe from (10) that ΦKA (p) = (pA−c)DA(p)+cK ifDA(p) ≥ K. The first expression
of (23) follows by noting that DA(p) = 1 ≥ K for pA < pB−τ. The second expression follows
by noting that DA(p) = (pB − pA + τ)/2τ ≥ K for pA ∈ [pB − τ, g(pB)] (by part (i)).
Again from (10), ΦKA (p) = pAD
p
A if DA(p) ≤ K. Since DA(p) = (pB− pA + τ)/2τ ≤ K for
pA ∈ [g(pB), pB + τ ] (by part (i)), the third expression of (23) follows. The last expression
follows by noting that DA(p) = 0 ≤ K for pA > pB + τ.
(iii) It follows from (23) that ΦKA (p) is increasing for pA ≤ pB − τ and it equals zero
for pA ≥ pB + τ. Therefore, to determine best response of A, it is sufficient to consider
pA ∈ [pB − τ, pB + τ ].
Let E1 = [pB − τ, g(pB)] and E2 = [g(pB), pB + τ ]. Observe from (23) that for pA ∈ E1,
firm A’s effective unit cost is c and its problem is the same as in the standard Hotelling game
H(c, cB). Taking i = A and cA = c in (22) of Lemma A1, the unconstrained maximum of
ΦKA (p) over pA ∈ E1 is attained at pA = bc(pB). Note from (22) that if pB > 3τ + c, then
bc(pB) = pB − τ. If pB ≤ 3τ + c, then bc(pB) = (pB + τ + c)/2 S g(pB) ⇔ pB T p where
p := 4τK − τ + c ≤ 3τ + c. Hence we conclude that
arg max
pA∈E1
ΦKA (p) =

g(pB) if pB < p
(pB + τ + c)/2 if p ≤ pB ≤ 3τ + c
pB − τ if pB > 3τ + c
(27)
Observe from (23) that for pA ∈ E2, firm A’s effective unit cost is 0 and its problem is the
same as in the standard Hotelling game H(0, cB). Taking i = A and cA = 0 in (22) of Lemma
A1, the unconstrained maximum of ΦKA (p) over pA ∈ E2 is attained at pA = b0(pB). Note
from (22) that if pB > 3τ, then b0(pB) = pB − τ ≤ g(pB), so the maximum is attained at
pA = g(pB). If pB ≤ 3τ, then b0(pB) = (pB + τ)/2 T g(pB)⇔ pB S p where p := 4τK − τ ≤
3τ. Hence we conclude that
arg max
pA∈E2
ΦKA (p) =
{
(pB + τ)/2 if pB ≤ p
g(pB) if pB > p
(28)
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As g(pB) ∈ E1 ∩E2, choosing pA = g(pB) is feasible for both E1 and E2. Using this fact, the
result in (24) follows from (27)-(28).
(iv) It follows from (iii) that bKA (pB) > g(pB) if pB < p, b
K
A (pB) < g(pB) if pB > p and
bKA (pB) = g(pB) if p ≤ pB ≤ p. Using this fact, the result follows from (i).
(v)-(vi) Noting that firm B’s constant unit cost of η is c, (25) follows from (2) and (3),
and (26) follows from (22) by taking i = B and cB = c.
(vii) Follows from (24) and (26) by the same reasoning as the proof of Lemma A1(ii).
Proof of Lemma 2 Using Lemma A2(vii), to find SPNE of HK(c, c), consider pA ≤ 3τ + c
and pB ≤ 3τ + c. From (24), firm A’s best response bKA (pB) is piecewise linear in pB with
three segments: bc(pB) (if pB > p), b0(pB) (if pB < p) and g(pB) (if pB ∈ [p, p]). From (26),
firm B’s best response is linear, given by bc(pB). Hence any segment of b
K
A (pB) can intersect
bc(pB) at most once. It will be useful to recall that for i = 1, 2, the SPNE price and market
share of firm i in H(cA, cB) are denoted by pi(cA, cB) and Di(cA, cB).
Note that bc(pB) is the best response of A in the standard Hotelling game H(c, c). Firm
B’s best response in this game is bc(pA). By Lemma 1(II), the unique solution of the system
(pA = bc(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = pA(c, c) and pB = pB(c, c). We note that pB(c, c) T p⇔
K S DA(c, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB > p iff pB = pB(c, c) > p, which holds
iff K < DA(c, c) (see Figure 1(a)). For this case, firm A fully utilizes its capacity K and
moreover produces DA(c, c)−K units of η in-house to meet its demand.
Next observe that b0(pB) is the best response of A in the standard Hotelling game H(0, c).
Firm B’s best response in this game is bc(pA). By Lemma 1(II), the unique solution of
the system (pA = b0(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = pA(0, c) and pB = pB(0, c). We note that
pB(0, c) S p ⇔ K T DA(0, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB < p iff pB = pB(0, c) < p,
which holds iff K > DA(0, c) (see Figure 1(b)). For this case, firm A does not utilize
K −DA(0, c) units of its capacity and does not produce η in-house.
Finally observe that the unique solution of (pA = g(pB), pB = bc(pA)) has pA = 3τ +
c − 4τK and pB = 2τ + c − 2τK. Note that 2τ + c − 2τK T p ⇔ K S DA(0, c) and
2τ + c − 2τK S p ⇔ K T DA(c, c). Hence we have an SPNE with pB ∈ [p, p] iff pB =
2τ +c−2τK ∈ [p, p], which holds iff K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] (see Figure 1(c)). For this case,
firm A’s SPNE market share exactly equals its capacity K. It fully utilizes its capacity and
does not produce η in-house.
The results (i)-(iv) of Lemma 2 follow from the conclusions above.
Proof of Proposition 3 From the proof of Prop 2 in the main text, we know that in stage 1
of ΓS(ω), firm A’s problem is to choose K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] to maximize piω(K). By (12)
and (13), piωA(K) = p
K
AK − ωK = (3τ + c− ω − 4τK)K, whose unconstrained maximum is
attained at
Θ(ω) := 3/8− (ω − c)/8τ (29)
As Θ(ω) < DA(0, c), over K ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)], the unique maximizer of piωA(K) is
K(ω) = max{Θ(ω), DA(c, c)} (30)
Comparing Θ(ω) with DA(c, c) = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ , we have
Θ(ω) T DA(c, c)⇔ ω S ĉ where ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ (31)
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First note that ĉ < c, since c − ĉ = τ − (c − c)/3 > τ − c > 0. Next observe that ĉ − c =
(4/3) [c− c− (3/4)τ ] . Hence
ĉ T c⇔ c− c T (3/4)τ (32)
From (30), (31) and (32), we conclude that
Observation 1 If c − c > (3/4)τ, then (i) K(ω) = Θ(ω) for ω ∈ (c, ĉ) and (ii) K(ω) =
DA(c, c) for ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
Observation 2 If c− c ≤ (3/4)τ, then K(ω) = DA(c, c) for all ω ∈ (c, c).
Noting that K(ω) ∈ [DA(c, c), DA(0, c)] for all cases, by Lemma 2(iii) it follows that the
market share of firm A is K(ω) and that of firm B is 1−K(ω).
Part I(a) The first two statements of I(a) are immediate from Observation 1(i). The
prices pSA, p
S
B in (15) follow by taking K = Θ(ω) in (12). Recall from Prop 1(II) that the
prices under no contracts are p0A = τ + θ and p
0
B = τ + θ where θ, θ are given in (5). From
(15), p0A − pSA(ω) = (ĉ− ω)/2 > 0 and p0B − pSB(ω) = (ĉ− ω)/4 > 0 where ĉ is given by (31).
This proves that all consumers are better off compared to no contracts.
The payoffs of the firms A,B are obtained by taking K = Θ(ω) in (13) and (14). Using
the values of pSA, p
S
B and θ(ω), it follows that
ΠSA(ω) = (3τ − ω + c)2/16τ (33)
ΠSB(ω) = (5τ + ω − c)2/32τ + (ω − c)(3τ − ω + c)/8τ (34)
By standard computations, it follows that ΠSA(ω) is decreasing and Π
S
B(ω) is increasing in ω.
Recall from Prop 1 that under no contracts, B obtains Π0B = (3τ + c − c)2/18τ. Note
that since τ > c and c− c > (3/4)τ , we have
ΠSB(c)− Π0B = −(27τ + 4c− 4c)[c− c− (3/4)τ ]/72τ < 0 and
ΠSB(ĉ)− Π0B = 2(3τ − c+ c)[c− c− (3/4)τ ]/9τ > 0.
By the monotonicity of ΠSB(ω), ∃ c˜ ∈ (0, ĉ) such that ΠSB(ω) T Π0B ⇔ ω T c˜. Standard
computations show that
c˜ := (11/3)τ + c− (2/9)
√
333τ 2 − 72στ − 12σ2 where σ ≡ c− c (35)
This completes the proof of I(a).
Part (I)(b) By Observation 1(ii), K(ω) = DA(c, c) = D
0
A for ω ∈ [ĉ, c). As a result,
prices and market shares are same as in the case of no contracts (Lemma 2(i),(iv)) which
shows that consumers are neither better off nor worse off. The payoffs follow from (13) and
(14). It is immediate that both firms are better off compared to no contracts.
Parts (II)-(III) It follows by Observations 1(ii) and 2 that the conclusion of part (II)
is the same as (I)(b). Part (III) follows from parts (I)-(II).
Proof of Proposition 4 Parts (I) and (II) have been proved in the main text. Here we
prove part (III).
Part (III)(a) Recall from Prop 1 that when there are no contracts, the SPNE prices are
p0A = τ + θ and p
0
B = τ + θ where c < θ < θ < c where θ, θ are given in (5). The SPNE prices
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in ΓT (ω) are pTA(ω) = p
T
B(ω) = τ +ω. Therefore, if ω ∈ (c, θ), then pTi (ω) < p0i for i ∈ {A,B}
and all consumers prefer technology transfer over no contracts. If ω ∈ (θ, c), pTi (ω) > p0i for
i ∈ {A,B} and all consumers prefer no contracts over technology transfer.
If ω ∈ [θ, θ], then pTA(ω) ≤ p0A and pTB(ω) ≥ p0B. Note that in ΓT (ω), firm A’s SPNE
market share is 1/2 > D0A where D
0
A = DA(c, c) is the SPNE market share of firm A under
no contracts. Consider the consumers at x ∈ [0, D0A]. In both cases (i.e., no contracts and
ΓT (ω)), they buy from firm A. As pTA(ω) ≤ p0A, these consumers are better off in ΓT (ω). Next
consider the consumers at x ∈ [1/2, 1]. In both cases they buy from firm B. As pTB(ω) ≥ p0B,
they are worse off in ΓT (ω). Finally consider any consumer at x ∈ (D0A, 1/2). When there is
no contract, such a consumer buys from firm B to obtain the net utility
U0x = V − p0B − τ(1− x) = V − (τ + θ)− τ(1− x)
In ΓT (ω), this consumer buys from A to obtain the net utility
UTx (ω) = V − pTA(ω)− τx = V − (τ + ω)− τx
Hence UTx (ω)− U0x T 0⇔ x S λ(ω) := 1/2− (ω − θ)/2τ. Since ω ≥ θ, we have λ(ω) ≤ 1/2.
Since D0A = 1/2− (c− c)/6τ, from (5) we have λ(ω)−D0A = (θ − ω)/2τ ≥ 0 (since ω ≤ θ).
Thus λ(ω) ∈ [D0A, 1/2]. We conclude that consumers at x ∈ (D0A, λ] prefer technology transfer
while consumers at x ∈ (λ, 1/2) prefer no contracts. Since consumers at x ∈ [0, D0A] prefer
technology transfer and x ∈ [1/2, 1] prefer no contracts, the proof of (III)(a) is complete.
Part (III)(b) Note that ΠT (ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c) and Φ0B = (3τ + c− c)2/18τ. Denoting
f(ω) := ΠT (ω)−Φ0B, note that f(ω) is increasing, f(c) = −(c− c)(6τ + c− c)/18τ < 0 and
f(c) = (c − c)(12τ − c + c)/18τ > 0. Hence ∃ θ̂ ∈ (c, c) such that ΠT (ω) T Φ0B ⇔ ω T θ̂.
Standard computations show that θ̂ ≡ θ + (c − c)2/18τ > θ. Comparing θ̂ with θ from (5),
we have θ − θ̂ = (c− c)(6τ − c+ c)/18τ > 0 proving that θ < θ̂ < θ.
Part (III)(c) Follows from parts (a) and (b).
Lemma A3 will be used to prove Proposition 5.
Lemma A3 Let ω ∈ (c, c). There are constants α, β ∈ (c, c) such that
(I) ΠTA(ω) T ΠSA(ω)⇔ ω T α.
(II) ΠTB(ω) T ΠSB(ω)⇔ ω T β.
Proof Denote σ ≡ c − c < τ. For i ∈ {A,B} let ∆i(ω) := ΠTi (ω) − ΠSi (ω). We prove the
lemma by showing that there are constants α, β ∈ (c, c) such that (I) ∆A(ω) T 0 ⇔ ω T α
and (II) ∆B(ω) T 0⇔ ω T β.
(I) Recall that ΠTA(ω) = τ/2 for all ω ∈ (c, c) (Prop 4) and ΠSA(ω) is decreasing in ω
(Prop 3). Hence ∆A(ω) is increasing in ω. To determine ∆A(ω), we consider the following
possible cases where ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, using the value of ΠSA(ω) by (33) of the proof of
Prop 3, we have ∆A(ω) = τ/2 − (3τ − ω + c)2/16τ. Observe that ∆A(c) = −τ/16 < 0
and ∆A(ĉ) = [2σ
2 − (3τ − 2σ)2]/18τ. Hence ∆A(ĉ) T 0 ⇔ σ T 3(2 −
√
2)τ/2. Noting that
3(2−√2)/2 ∈ (3/4, 1), We have the following two possibilities.
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(i) If 3(2 − √2)τ/2 < σ < τ, then ∆A(ĉ) > 0. Since ∆A(c) < 0, ∃ α̂ ∈ (c, ĉ) such that
∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α̂. Standard computations show that
α̂ ≡ (3− 2
√
2)τ + c (36)
(ii) If (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, then ∆A(ĉ) ≤ 0. Hence ∆A(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ).
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): Using the value of ΠSA(ω) from Prop 3(I)(b) and Prop 1, we have
∆A(ω) = τ/2− ΠSA(ω) = τ/2− (3τ − σ)2/18τ − (c− ω)(3τ − σ)/6τ
Note that ∆A(c) = σ(6τ − σ)/18τ > 0. Noting that ∆A(ω) is continuous, from the last case
we know that ∆A(ĉ) T 0⇔ σ T 3(2−
√
2)τ/2. Again we consider two possibilities.
(i) If 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ, then ∆A(ĉ) > 0. Hence ∆A(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ [ĉ, c).
(ii) If (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, then ∆A(ĉ) ≤ 0. Since ∆A(c) > 0, ∃ α˜ ∈ (ĉ, c) such that
∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α˜. Standard computations show that
α˜ ≡ 2cτ/(3τ − σ)− σ(c+ c)/3(3τ − σ) + c/3. (37)
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, by Prop 3(II), ∆A(ω) is the same as in Subcase 1(b) for all
ω ∈ (c, c). We know from Subcase 1(b) that ∆A(c) > 0. As ∆A(c) = −σ(3τ − 2σ)/18τ < 0,
we conclude that ∃ α˜ ∈ (c, c) [given in (37)] such that ∆A(ω) T 0⇔ ω T α˜.
Define
α :=
{
α̂ if 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ
α˜ if σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2 (38)
Using (38), for 3(2−√2)τ/2 < σ < τ, the result follows from Subcases [1(a)(i)]-[1(b)(i)], for
(3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2−√2)τ/2, it follows from Subcases [1(a)(ii)]-[1(b)(ii)] and for σ ≤ (3/4)τ,
from Case 2.
(II) Recall from Prop 4 that ΠTB(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c) for all ω ∈ (c, c) so that ∆B(ω) =
τ/2 + (ω − c)− ΠSB(ω). We consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case, using the value of ΠSB(ω) from (34), we have
∆B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c)[5/8 + (ω − c)/8τ ]− (5τ + ω − c)2/32τ
Note that ∆B(ω) is increasing in ω. Now observe that ∆B(ĉ) = [(τ + 2σ)
2 − 13τ 2]/24τ <
(9τ 2 − 13τ 2)/24τ < 0 (since σ < τ). Hence ∆B(ω) < 0 for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ).
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): Using the value of ΠSB(ω) from Prop 3(I)(b) and Prop 1, we have
∆B(ω) = τ/2 + (ω − c)(1/2 + σ/6τ)− (3τ + σ)2/18τ
Note that ∆B(ω) is increasing in ω. We know from the last case that ∆B(ĉ) < 0. Observing
that ∆B(c) = σ(3τ + 2σ)/18τ > 0, we conclude that ∃ β ∈ (ĉ, c) such that ∆B(ω) T 0 ⇔
ω T β. Standard computations show that
β ≡ 2cτ/(3τ + σ) + σ(c+ c)/3(3τ + σ) + c/3 (39)
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Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, by Prop 3(II), ΠSB(ω) and ∆B(ω) are the same as in
Subcase 1(b) for all ω ∈ (c, c). From Subcase 1(b), we know that ∆B(c) > 0. Noting that
∆B(c) = −σ(6τ + σ)/18τ < 0, we conclude that ∃ β ∈ (c, c) [given in (39)] such that
∆B(ω) T 0⇔ ω T β.
The result for σ > (3/4)τ follows from Subcases 1(a)-(b) and for σ ≤ (3/4)τ, it follows
from Case 2.
Proof of Proposition 5: Part (I) We prove (I) from Lemma A3 by showing that α < β.
Recall the notation σ := c − c. First let σ > 3(2 − √2)τ/2 > (3/4)τ. Then by Case 1 of
the proof Lemma A3(II), β > ĉ and by subcases [1(a)(i)]-[1(b)(i)] and (38) of the proof of
Lemma A3(I), α = α̂ < ĉ. Hence β > α. Next consider σ ≤ 3(2 − √2)τ/2. Then by (38),
α = α˜. By (37) and (39) we have β − α˜ = σ(9τ 2 + σ2)/3(9τ 2 − σ2) > 0.
Part (II) Recall from Prop 4 that SPNE prices in ΓT (ω) are pTA(ω) = p
T
B(ω) = τ + ω.
We consider the following possible cases.
Case 1 σ > (3/4)τ :
Subcase 1(a) ω ∈ (c, ĉ): For this case using the values pSA(ω), pSB(ω) (SPNE prices in ΓS(ω))
from (15) of Prop 3, it follows that pSA(ω) − pTA(ω) = (τ + c − ω)/2 > 0 (since τ > c > ω)
and pSB(ω)− pTB(ω) = (τ + 3c− 3ω)/4 T 0 ⇔ ω S τ/3 + c. As ĉ ≡ 4c/3− c/3− τ, we have
(τ/3 + c) − ĉ = (4/3)(τ + c − c) > 0. Therefore, for all ω ∈ (c, ĉ), we have ω < τ/3 + c
so that pSB(ω) > p
T
B(ω). Consequently for this case all consumers prefer technology transfer
over outsourcing.
Subcase 1(b) ω ∈ [ĉ, c): Note from Prop 3(I)(b) that for this case the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω)
are the same as in the case of no contracts. Therefore, comparing outsourcing and technology
transfer for consumers is the same as comparing technology transfer with no contracts and
we can use the results of Prop 4(III)(a).
Since θ = (2c + c)/3 and ĉ = 4c/3 − c/3 − τ, we have θ − ĉ = τ + c − c > 0, i.e., θ > ĉ.
Using the partition [ĉ, c) = [ĉ, θ)∪ [θ, θ]∪(θ, c), the conclusion for this case is immediate from
Prop 4(III)(a). Combining the conclusions of Subcases 1(a)-(b), the proof for σ > (3/4)τ is
complete.
Case 2 σ ≤ (3/4)τ : For this case, for all ω ∈ (c, c), the SPNE prices in ΓS(ω) are the same
as the case of no contracts and the result is again direct from Prop 4(III)(a).
Part (III) First we prove (i) α < θ and (ii) θ < β < θ.
To prove inequality (i), note from (38) that if σ > 3(2−√2)τ/2 > (3/4)τ, then α = α̂ <
ĉ < θ. If σ ≤ 3(2 − √2)τ/2, then α = α˜ and by (37) we have θ − α˜ = σ2/3(3τ − σ) > 0.
Therefore α < θ in all cases.
Inequality (ii) follows from (39) and (5) by noting that β − θ = τσ/(3τ + σ) > 0 and
θ − β = σ2/3(3τ + σ) > 0. Hence θ < β < θ.
Using the conclusions of (I)-(II), part (III)(a) follows from inequality (i) and part (III)(b)
follows from inequality (ii).
Lemma A4 c∗ < α where c∗ is given in (16) and α is given in (38).
Proof Recall that we denote σ ≡ c− c. If σ ≤ (3/4)τ, then by (16), c∗ = c < α.
If σ > (3/4)τ, then by (16), c∗ = c˜. We know from Prop 3(I)(a) that c˜ < ĉ. Note from
(38) that if (3/4)τ < σ ≤ 3(2 − √2)τ/2, then α = α˜. From the conclusion just preceding
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(37), we have α˜ > ĉ > c˜. Hence for this case α > c∗.
Finally observe from (38) that if σ > 3(2 − √2)τ/2, then α = α̂. We still have c∗ = c˜.
From (35) and (36), standard computations yield
α̂ > c˜⇔ h(σ) > 0 where h(σ) := −2σ2 − 12τσ + 9(3−
√
2)τ 2
As h(σ) is an inverse u-shaped quadratic function, h(3(2−√2)τ/2) = 9(3√2−4)τ 2 > 0 and
h(τ) = (13 − 9√2)τ 2 > 0, it follows that h(σ) > 0 for all σ ∈ (3(2 −√2)τ/2, τ). Therefore
α̂ > c˜ in this interval and hence α > c∗.
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